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Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited.
Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could
offer only a modest income for non-participants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance
toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments, but in fact results in a surprisingly high
average payoff for group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns
reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant strategies or two-strategy alliances can
characterize the final state of evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the
superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is robust and can be observed both
in well-mixed and in structured populations highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of coopera-
tion among players who are motivated to search for maximal
individual income during their interactions with competitors
[1]. Although mutual cooperation would provide the opti-
mal income for the whole community, a higher payoff can be
reached individually by exploiting others. This conflict, sum-
marized in several social dilemmas [2], can be identified as
the key problem in a broad range of research fields [3–8].
Staying with a specific example, it is always disappoint-
ing to realize when some of our partners defect in a working
group, which significantly lowers the income of cooperator
members. A natural reaction could be to punish the traitor, but
the institution of punishment raises further questions, which
sometimes just transfers the basic problem to another level
[9–14]. An alternative response from betrayed cooperators
could be to stop further cooperation and not to participate in
the joint venture anymore. Accordingly, cooperators may be-
come “loners” because the latter strategy can offer a modest,
but at least guaranteed, payoff to them. Previous works re-
vealed that the option of voluntary participation in common
ventures could be an effective way to avoid being exploited
because it introduces a cyclic dominance between competing
strategies of defectors, cooperators, and loners [15–17]. As
a consequence, the cooperator state can survive even in harsh
conditions when a low synergy factor would result in a full de-
fector state in a two-strategy system where participation in a
public goods game is compulsory. There is, however, a disap-
pointing feature of the new, three-strategy solution. Namely,
the average payoff is unable to exceed the income of a loner’s
strategy, hence participating in a public goods game does not
necessarily provide an attractive option for competing players
[15, 18].
This failure suggests that perhaps it is not the best option for
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cooperators to leave the group when defectors emerge because
by switching to a loner state they lose all benefits of mutual
cooperation immediately. In this way the original dilemma
can be transformed into a new form where cooperator players
should decide how many defectors they tolerate in their group
before leaving the group for a modest, but guaranteed payoff.
To explore this new dilemma we introduce a four-strategy
model of a public goods game in which besides the uncondi-
tional defector (D), cooperator (C), and loner (L) strategies
there is a so-called tolerant or mixed (M ) strategy, that be-
haves as a cooperator as long as the number of defectors re-
mains below a threshold value in the group but it switches to
loner a state otherwise. By following this approach we can
check the viability of this mixed strategy and clarify if there
is an optimal level of tolerance which provides the highest in-
come for the whole population.
Beyond these fundamental questions there is an additional
aspect which makes the proposed model even more interest-
ing. On one hand, the coexistence of C, D, and L strategies is
based on the previously mentioned cyclic dominance between
competing strategies, which is a well identified general mech-
anism to maintain diversity [19–25]. On the other hand, by
considering M players we introduce a strategy which is less
harmful to defectors because they may coexist. Intuitively,
one may expect that such intervention is beneficial to defec-
tion, but, as we demonstrate in this paper, the opposite effect
can be observed.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We present the
definition of the model in the next section. Results obtained
by means of the replicator equation in well-mixed populations
are summarized in Section III, which is followed by the pre-
sentation of Monte Carlo results obtained in structured pop-
ulations. Finally we conclude with an argument for broader
validity of our observations and a discussion of their implica-
tions in Section IV.
2II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH TOLERANT PLAYERS
We consider a public goods game where the game is played
in groups of size G. Following the standard model [15], each
player is set as an unconditional cooperator (C), an uncondi-
tional defector (D), or a loner (L). Whereas each cooperator
contributes an amount c to the common pool, defectors con-
tribute nothing but exploit others’ efforts. Loners do not par-
ticipate in the joint enterprise, instead, they prefer a moderate,
but guaranteed, σ income. Beyond these well-known strate-
gies we consider an additional, so-called mixed (M ) strategy.
The latter players are principally cooperators who contribute
to the common pool but permanently monitor the status of
other players in the group at an additional cost of γ. This extra
knowledge allows them to realize if the level of defection ex-
ceeds a certain level in the group. As a reaction, they become
loners and stop contributing to the common pool. Designating
then the number of unconditional cooperators, defectors, and
“mixed” players among the otherG−1 players in the group as
nC , nD and nM , the payoff of the four competing strategies
are the following:
ΠD =
r(nC + δnM )
nC + nD + 1 + δnM
(1)
ΠC =
r(nC + 1 + δnM )
nC + nD + 1 + δnM
− 1 (2)
ΠL = σ (3)
ΠM = δ
[
r(nC + 1 + nM )
nC + nD + 1 + nM
− 1
]
+ (1− δ)σ − γ . (4)
Here, according to the broadly accepted notation, r depicts the
synergy factor, characterizing the benefit of mutual coopera-
tion, whereas σ is the loner’s payoff. It should be emphasized
that the r > 1 synergy factor is applied only if there are more
than one contributor to the common pool, otherwise r = 1
is used. In this way we can avoid an artificial support of a
lonely cooperator against loners and prevent single individ-
uals playing a public goods game with themselves [26]. Fur-
thermore, without loss of generality, cooperators’ contribution
to the common pool is considered to be c = 1, as Eqs. (2) and
(4) indicate. Lastly, in close agreement with previous works
[15, 18], the payoff of loners is chosen as σ = 1, but we stress
that using other values would not change our main findings.
As we already noted, it is a fundamental point that an M
player uses a more sophisticated strategy by checking the sta-
tus of other players in the group. Accordingly, such a player
behaves as a loner and refuses participating in the public
goods game if the number of defectors reaches a critical H
threshold in the group. Otherwise, when the total number of
defectors is below the H threshold, M cooperates and con-
tributes to the common pool similarly to unconditional coop-
erators. The possible “switch” of a player’s status, or say-
ing differently the adoption to change a neighborhood, can be
handled technically via a δ factor, which is δ = 0 if nD ≥ H
or δ = 1 if nD < H .
Formally, strategy L can be considered as a cost-free, very
special mixed player who applies zero threshold, hence he al-
ways avoids participating in a joint venture independent of the
strategies of other group members. In general, the value of H
characterizes the level of tolerance of M players. Namely, the
higher H is applied, the more defectors are accepted in the
group without refusing cooperation from M players. As an
extreme case, formally H = G denotes the situation when M
players remain in an unconditional cooperator state. Hence
we may say that the concept of “tolerance” builds a bridge be-
tween loner and unconditionally cooperator behaviors. Close
to the latter end, H = G − 1 represents the case when an M
player seems to be almost “endlessly tolerant” and becomes
a loner only if all the others in the group are defectors, hence
cooperation becomes unambiguously pointless to him.
Evidently, the extra knowledge of M players needs addi-
tional efforts from their side, which can be implemented via
an additional cost γ. This cost should always be considered,
no matter whether M plays a C or L strategy, as indicated in
Eq. (4). The presence of this permanent cost also means that
M players have no obvious advantage either overC or over L
strategies.
In the following we consider both well-mixed and struc-
tured populations.
III. RESULTS
A. Well-mixed populations
In a well-mixed system the fraction of C,D,L, and M
players can be denoted by x, y, z, and w respectively. Evi-
dently, they are not independent but are normalized and al-
ways fulfill the equation x + y + z + w = 1. Consequently,
the strategy evolution can be studied by using replicator dy-
namics [27]:
x˙ = x(PC − P )
y˙ = y(PD − P ) (5)
z˙ = z(PL − P ) ,
where dots denote the derivatives with respect to time t. Here
the average payoff P for the whole population is given by
P = xPC + yPD + zPL + wPM , (6)
where Pi (i = C,D,L,M ) designates the average payoff for
each strategy:
Pi =
∑
nC ,nD,nL,nM
(G− 1)!
nC !nD!nL!nM !
xnCynDznLwnMΠi (7)
where 0 ≤ ni ≤ G−1 and
∑
ni = G−1 are always fulfilled.
For the sake of comparison with the case of a struc-
tured population we suppose that players form groups of
size G = 5 randomly and consider the impact of different
H = 1, . . . , G− 1 threshold values of tolerance.
Our principal goal is to compare the results of a well-mixed
and spatially structured population, therefore we will launch
the evolution from a random initial state where all compet-
ing strategies are present with equal weight. The replicator
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Replicator dynamics on the boundary faces
of the simplex S4 using the G = 5 group size. Filled circles repre-
sent stable fixed points whereas open circles represent unstable fixed
points. Parameter values are H = 2, r = 3.5, γ = 0.6 for panel (a),
whereas H = 4, r = 3.8, γ = 0.04 for panel (b). Flow diagrams
suggest that both (D,C,L) and (D,C,M) strategies can form a
rock-paper-scissors cycle, but the stable two-strategy (D,M ) phase
also emerges in dependence on the initial fraction of strategies.
dynamics, however, may depend sensitively on the initial fre-
quencies of strategies. This behavior is illustrated in Fig. 1
where we have plotted two representative flow diagrams in
the unit simplex S4 at two branches of parameter values.
The top panel illustrates the case when the H = 2 thresh-
old value is applied at a significantly high γ cost of inspec-
tion when the synergy factor is moderate. Here, as is already
known from a previous work [15], the w = 0 face contains
a fix point which is surrounded by periodic orbits. On the
z = 0 face, however, there is a stable limit circle which is
the composition of (D,C,M) strategies. Furthermore, a sta-
ble two-strategy fix point can also be detected on the x = 0
face. In the bottom panel, which was taken at the H = 4
threshold level, we can observe that the (D,M) solution re-
mains stable whereas the rock-scissors-paper-type (D,C,M)
solution disappears. Naturally, the portrayal of replicator dy-
namics can also depend on the applied r and γ parameters,
but the presented plots are representative in a broad interval
of parameters.
In the following we focus on the evolution from a random
initial state where all strategies are present with equal weight,
but we scan the whole r − γ parameter plane. Interestingly,
when H = 1 then strategy M cannot survive at any finite
values of γ. Here, (D,C,L) strategies form the well-known
rock-scissors-paper type solution in the 2 < r < 5 region
[15]. At low γ values, however, M players may crowd out
loners first from a random state, which is followed by the ex-
tinction of defectors. Finally, when M remains alone with
unconditional C players, M is defeated by the latter strategy.
This time evolution is similar to the “The Moor has done his
duty, the Moor may go” effect previously observed in a related
model where punishing strategies were studied [28]. Never-
theless, we should emphasize that the only stable solution is
the mentioned three-strategy (D,C,L) state at H = 1.
By increasing the tolerance level, however, we can observe
new types of solutions. Namely, strategy M can replace L
players and forms another solution where D, C, and M play-
ers dominate each other cyclically. As the top panel of Fig. 2
illustrates, this (D,C,M) state can be dominant even at a sig-
nificantly high γ cost if synergy factor r is high enough. The
latter condition, when mutual cooperation pays more, is es-
sential, otherwise the benefit of mutual cooperation could not
compensate the additional cost of strategy M .
The previously mentioned two-strategy solution can evolve
starting from a complete, four-strategy initial state. Here D
andM players form a two-strategy alliance against other com-
peting strategies [29, 30]. Note that unconditional cooperators
would beat strategy M in the absence of defectors, but the
presence of latter players manifests the advantage of a mixed
strategy. This solution, as we emphasize in the subsequent
section, is of prime importance to understand why tolerance
emerges during an evolutionary process. Lastly, we briefly
note that there is a specific combination of D,L, and M play-
ers which could prevail in the whole system, albeit at a very
limited parameter region.
Qualitatively similar behavior can be observed for other
H > 1 threshold values, too, but solutions containing mixed
players become less vital as we increase H . The bottom panel
of Fig. 2, obtained at H = 4, illustrates that the benefit of
mixed strategy is less likely at such a high tolerance level and
the area where strategy M survives on the γ − r parameter
plane shrinks significantly.
It is an important consequence that the introduction of toler-
ance does not only result in the individual success of strategy
M , but also has a favorable impact on the general well-being
of the whole population. This effect can be illustrated nicely
if we compare the average payoff values obtained at different
threshold levels. Figure 3 highlights that adopting a nonzero,
but moderate tolerance towards defection could elevate signif-
icantly the global income of players. As we already noted, the
usage of the minimal H = 1 tolerance level does not allow
M players to survive, hence the system becomes equivalent
to the well-known three-strategy model [15]. Here the pres-
ence of L players can help to avoid the tragedy of the common
state [31], but the average payoff cannot exceed the loners’ in-
come that is σ = 1 in the present case. At a higher tolerance
threshold, the average income in the whole population can in-
crease significantly due to the presence of tolerant players.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Full r− γ phase diagrams for the well-mixed
system in the case of G = 5 group size. In panel (a) H = 2 whereas
in panel (b)H = 4 threshold values are applied. Solid lines represent
continuous, while dashed lines indicate discontinuous transitions be-
tween stable solutions. At moderate γ values M players replace lon-
ers by forming a cyclic dominant coexistence with C and D players.
M players are more viable at an intermediate threshold value. Inter-
estingly, strategy M can form a two-strategy alliance with D which
can dominate the evolution at specific parameter values.
This enhancement is particularly conspicuous for H = 2. For
comparison, the dashed grey line shows the average income
in the idealistic state when all players are in an unconditional
cooperator state. It suggests that the usage of tolerant players
could be especially efficient at low r values when cooperators
would face a harsh environment otherwise.
B. Structured populations
Considering a structured population where players have
fixed neighborhood offers not just a more appropriate ap-
proach to some real-life situations but it often provides novel
and sometimes unexpected behaviors which are absent in a
well-mixed system [32–34]. To explore and clarify the pos-
sible differences between emerging solutions we consider
a structured population where players are distributed on a
square graph and form groups with their nearest neighbors
(G = 5). It also means that a player is involved not only in
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Average payoffs in stable stationary states in
dependence of synergy factor r as obtained for different threshold
values of tolerance at γ = 0.04. Players are in a well-mixed popula-
tion where they form groups of size G = 5 randomly. For compari-
son, we also show the maximum reachable average payoff that can be
obtained in the state, marked by a dashed grey line, where all play-
ers are in unconditional cooperator states. Note that in the case of
H = 1 the stable solution is the traditional three-strategy state when
D,C, and L players form a cyclic dominant solution [15]. Here the
average payoff cannot exceed the loner’s σ = 1 income. By using a
bit higher tolerance level, however, a significant improvement can be
reached, which is comparable to the value obtained in an idealistic
(all C) state.
the game where it is a focal player but also in the games of his
neighbors. Therefore a player may participate in G = 5 pub-
lic goods games, and the total payoff should be accumulated
accordingly.
During the strategy update protocol, we apply strategy im-
itation based on pairwise comparison of competing strategies
[34]. Namely, a player x will adopt the strategy of a neighbor-
ing player y with a probability
Γ(Πx −Πy) =
1
1 + exp((Πx −Πy)/K)
, (8)
where K is the noise parameter. Without loss of generality
we will use a representative K = 0.5 value, which ensures
that strategies of better-performing players are adopted almost
always by their neighbors, although adopting the strategy of a
player that performs worse is not impossible.
In an elementary step, we choose a player and his neigh-
bor randomly. If their strategies are different then the strategy
imitation is executed with the probability defined by Eq. 8.
In a complete Monte Carlo step (MCS) every player has one
chance on average to update his strategy. To get reliable phase
diagrams, which are valid in the large system size limit, the
system size was chosen from 400× 400 to 6400× 6400, and
the relaxation time was between 20000 and 100000 MCS. To
further improve accuracy, the results of the stationary state
were averaged over 10 independent realizations for each set
of parameter values.
We should stress that the evolution of strategies in a struc-
tured population is highly independent of the initial state if all
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Full r − γ phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game where players are distributed on a square lattice forming
G = 5 size of groups. DifferentH threshold values are indicated. Solid lines represent continuous, whereas dashed lines indicate discontinuous
transitions between stable solutions. The comparison of diagrams shows that a moderate tolerance, an intermediate threshold value ofH , allows
M players to prevail even at a significantly high cost value.
competing strategies are present. The only critical condition
is the sufficiently large system size which prevents finite-size
effects and allows a stable solution to emerge somewhere in
a space from a random initial distribution. Later this solution
can invade the whole space and remains stable.
In our model there are three key parameters, namely the
r, γ, and H threshold level. To demonstrate their impacts
on the stable solutions we have presented the resulting phase
diagrams for the four possible threshold values in Fig. 4.
In general, as expected, strategy M always dies out if the
inspection cost is too large and we get back the well-known
three-strategy (D,C,L) model. In this case unconditional co-
operators can survive above r ≥ 2.19 due to cyclic dominance
and form a three-strategy (D,C,L) phase. If the synergy fac-
tor is high enough and strategy C is capable to coexist with
D due to network reciprocity then the previously mentioned
cyclic dominance is broken, which will result in the extinction
of strategy L. Consequently, a two-strategy (D,C) phase re-
mains where the fraction of defectors decreases gradually as
we increase r.
Significantly different behavior can be obtained if the extra
γ cost of M players is reasonably moderate. As a general ob-
servation, which is partly against mean-field results, strategy
M becomes viable, but the composition of the stable solution
depends sensitively on the threshold value of tolerance. The
lowest nonzeroH = 1 value represents a special case because
here M can only survive with D in the presence of C players.
Due to this low threshold an M player changes from the C
to the L state immediately when it recognizes the presence of
a defector in the group, hence the previous mentioned cyclic
dominance is established, but instead of the (D,C,L) cycle
the strategies M → D → C →M will form the stable three-
strategy solution. In other words, L is simply replaced by M
who takes the role of the former strategy. The advantage of
a three-strategy solution over the other state depends on the
average rotation speed between cyclic members: If the inva-
sion rate is faster, then it can stabilize a solution [30]. By
increasing r we may observe a reentrant transition between
(D,C,L)→ (D,C,M)→ (D,C,L) phases, which is again
a general behavior when the average invasion rates within a
cycle can be adjusted by varying a control parameter [35].
If we increase H and allow M players to “tolerate” the
presence of defectors further then a new kind of solution
emerges, which was already observed in the well-mixed sys-
tem. In this case M can coexist with D without the presence
of a third party. As we will show later, this (D,M) solu-
6tion can be specially efficient to reach a state when a high
average payoff can be reached for the whole population. Be-
sides the mentioned two-strategy solution, there are parameter
values where all four competing strategies coexist, and there
are some specific cases when M crowds out unconditional C
but stay together with L in the presence of D. Here D and
M players are still capable of forming a two-strategy solu-
tion, but L players can invade defectors. As a result, small
L patches emerge temporarily, but they are vulnerable against
the invasion of M players, who are capable of utilizing net-
work reciprocity, which closes the cycle.
Figure 4 highlights that the new kind of solution can also
emerge in a structured population. In particular, we can
observe a stable coexistence of four strategies (marked by
DCML in phase diagrams) which is absent in a well-mixed
system. Such a kind of coexistence of competing strategies is
a general feature of structured populations which is a straight-
forward consequence of the limited interactions of players
[32].
The comparison of phase diagrams obtained for different
tolerance thresholds highlights that there is an optimal inter-
mediate tolerance level which provides the best condition for
M players. In this case strategy M can survive even at a sig-
nificantly high inspection cost. Note that an M player should
always bear this cost but has to invest also in the common pool
when it cooperates. At H = 2, for instance, M should pay
nearly double cost of the unconditionalC strategy, still, it can
crowd out both C and L strategies. On the other hand, such a
high “peak” is missing both at H = 1 and at H = 4, which
can be considered as extreme (too high or too low) threshold
values.
Based on the comparison of phase diagrams we can con-
clude that neither too small nor too high tolerance will help
M players survive and they become extinct at relatively small
γ values. This observation agrees with our previous experi-
ences obtained for a well-mixed population. It is worth stress-
ing, however, that a tolerant strategy prevails more easily in a
structured population and M players can survive even at ex-
tremely high additional cost γ.
In the following we provide an intuitive explanation why
tolerance can offer a viable way to handle defection. It should
be emphasized that the three-strategy (D,C,L) phase is al-
ways a solution in the low-r region [15]. To understand the
superiority of the (D,M) phase we will start the evolution
from a special, prepared initial state where both the cyclically
dominated phase and the stable coexistence of D andM play-
ers could evolve calmly in a restricted area first. Panel (a)
of Fig. 5 illustrates the final result of these isolated evolu-
tions. After, we let the borders open, and the battle of so-
lutions starts. The elementary steps of this competition are
identified in panel (b), which is zoomed out for clarity. In this
snapshot we can distinguish three different cases of how the
three-strategy solution meets with the external two-strategy
(D,M) phase. If a C domain, marked by dark blue, is at the
frontier then unconditional cooperators start spreading in the
sea of M . [These invasions are marked by “I” in panel (b).]
The success of C, however, is temporary, because defectors,
marked by red, will follow them and gradually invade the in-
D C M L
(a) (b) (c)
(d)
I
II
II
I
III
IV
IV
FIG. 5: (Color online) The competition of two possible solutions at
r = 2.7, γ = 0.15, using H = 2 on a 200 × 200 square lattice. De-
fectors are denoted by red (middle grey), unconditional cooperators
are denoted by dark blue (dark grey), tolerant players are denoted by
light blue (light grey), whereas loners are denoted by a green color
(dotted lighted grey), as indicated by the legend on the top. At the
specific parameter values both the cyclic dominant (D,C,L) and
two-strategy (D,M) phases could be possible solutions. Panel (a)
illustrates a prepared initial state where a cyclic dominant solution
is embraced by the other stable solution. In panel (b) we opened
the borders and allowed solutions to compete for space. Eventually
the (D,M) solution crowds out the other phase, as is illustrated in
panel (c), and finally the two-strategy phase prevails (not shown).
Panel (d) shows the enlarged part of panel (b) to illustrate the micro-
scopic mechanisms that are responsible for the successful invasion
of the (D,M) solution. Further details are given in the main text.
Snapshots were taken at 0, 70, 210 MCSs.
vaders. [This stage is marked by “II” in panel (b).] After,
when D players remain alone with M players then the latter
(marked by light blue) will regulate defectors and lower their
concentration to a minimal level. The second option of how
competing solutions meet is when aD spot from the (D,C,L)
phase meets with the external (D,M) phase. [This is marked
by “III” in panel (b).] In this case the previously described
“regulation” process starts immediately, which will decrease
the area of the (D,C,L) phase. Finally, when an L domain
(marked by green) is at the interface then it will shrink im-
7mediately because M is able to utilize the positive impact of
network reciprocity. (This process is marked by “IV” in the
panel.) Altogether, the three elementary processes will reduce
the area of the middle zone. As the total area of the three-
strategy phase shrinks, it becomes more vulnerable against an
external invasion because the local oscillations of (D,C,L)
strategies are significant in small patches. (Note that in the
middle zone L’s would only survive if defectors feed them
due to the cyclic dominance.) Consequently, when the width
of the middle zone becomes comparable to the typical size
of patches then the three-strategy phase can be easily trapped
into a homogeneous state. This stage is illustrated in panel (c)
in Fig. 5. After, independent of which strategy is present at the
frontier, the phase becomes an easy prey for the two-strategy
(D,M) phase. Finally this solution will invade the whole sys-
tem (not shown). We stress again that the system will termi-
nate into the same state if we start the evolution from a random
state independent of the initial fractions of strategies.
In agreement with the well-mixed case, the application of
a moderate tolerance level does not only help strategy M to
survive, but it also has a useful impact on the average payoff of
the whole population. This observation is specially important
because a previous work highlighted that the introduction of
loner strategy is unable to solve the original problem of the
public goods game and the average payoff cannot exceed the
income of the loner’s strategy [15]. Therefore, to participate
in the joint venture is not an attractive option for loners.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Average payoff in dependence of a synergy
factor using different thresholds of tolerance when G = 5. The cost
of inspection is γ = 0.04 for all cases. For comparison, the result of
the traditional three-strategy model is also plotted where only pure
D,C and L players are present. The highest collective payoff is
marked by the dashed grey line which can only be reached in the
idealistic case if all players cooperate unconditionally in the group.
The concept of tolerance, however, can resolve this
dilemma. Figure 6 illustrates the average payoff in depen-
dence of the synergy factor for different threshold values of
tolerance at a reasonable cost of inspection. (Note that qual-
itatively similar behavior can be obtained for higher cost val-
ues.) For comparison, the average payoff is also plotted in
the traditional model where only the pure (D,C,L) strategies
are present. In the latter case the growth of the general pay-
off is being hindered by the presence of strategy L no matter
how we apply higher r. The average income of players can
only increase significantly when loners die out. In the lat-
ter case, when r is high enough, the network reciprocity can
lower the fraction of defectors efficiently which will be fol-
lowed by the general rise in payoff. To evaluate properly the
payoff values due to tolerance we have also plotted the high-
est collective payoff value (marked by the dashed grey line)
which can be obtained only if all players cooperate uncondi-
tionally in the group. Figure 6 shows that the system can be
very close to this idealistic state even if M players have to
bear an extra cost. In agreement with our previous observa-
tion in well-mixed systems, this effect is the strongest at low r
values, where cooperation would be unlikely otherwise. This
feature suggests that the application of tolerance becomes ex-
tremely useful when the other cooperator supporting mecha-
nism, based on network reciprocity, becomes fragile.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The fraction of defector players in dependence
of a synergy factor for those threshold values where the application
of tolerance is capable of suppressing the vitality of defectors. For
both cases γ = 0.04 was applied as for Fig. 6. For comparison, the
fraction of defectors is also plotted when only unconditional L and
C strategies fight against defection. Note that defectors could only
grow notably when strategy M dies out.
Rather counterintuitively, the concept of tolerance of de-
fection is capable of minimizing the occurrence of defectors.
This effect is illustrated in Fig. 7 where we have plotted the
fraction of defectors for the cases when the appropriately cho-
sen tolerance level can result in a notably high average pay-
off. For comparison, we have also plotted the level of de-
fection in the reference three-strategy (C,D,L) model. As
the plot shows, we can reach only limited impact on reduc-
ing defection by applying unconditional loners. The latter
strategy gives a too “drastic” response to defection and can-
not utilize the positive effect of network reciprocity. Tolerant
players, however, use both sides of the coin: Punish defectors
by switching to the loner state if it is inevitable, but remain a
cooperator until the last chance. Consequently, they can reach
a competitive payoff, which could also be attractive for other
players that will reduce the defection level implicitly.
The clear advantage of an intermediate tolerance level can
be illustrated nicely if we apply larger groups where even
8more different H threshold values are available. Larger
groups can be easily formed if we extend the interaction range
from the von Neumann to the Moore neighborhood where
players are arranged into G = 9 group size with their nearest
and next-nearest neighbors. For comparison, in Figure 8 we
have also plotted the related payoff values for a well-mixed
system where the same group size was applied. These plots
demonstrate clearly that having tolerant players in the pop-
ulation is beneficial to the whole society. Furthermore, in a
spatial system, where bonds are limited and are maintained
for a long time, even a higher tolerance threshold could be the
best compromise which provides the highest average payoff
for players at some parameter values. Naturally, this effect
can be even more pronounced for larger group sizes which are
typical for human systems [36–38].
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Average payoff in dependence of the thresh-
old value of tolerance for different synergy factors when a Moore-
neighborhood is applied. The inset shows the payoff values for a
well-mixed case where the same G = 9 group size is considered.
For both topologies we used the fixed γ = 0.1 inspection cost. The
applied synergy factors are r = 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5 and 5 from bottom
to top. Note that H = 0 corresponds to the three-strategy (D,C,L)
model where M players are unable to survive. Because of discrete
values of H , the dashed lines are just guides to the eye. (The error
bars are smaller than the symbol sizes.)
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is our everyday experience that tolerance embraces us
whereas the absence of it has serious consequences on the
whole community. Our simple model can provide an intu-
itive explanation for its evolutionary origin: Albeit it might
be costly, but it pays to monitor our neighborhood and react
on how the cooperation level changes around us. Even if we
recognize some defection in our group we should show toler-
ance towards it because by quitting out from the joint venture
we would loose the possible benefit of mutual cooperation.
But, of course, we should not be tolerant endlessly because
such an attitude takes the system back to the original version
of the dilemma where uncontrolled defectors can exploit un-
conditional cooperators easily. Instead, a delicately adjusted
threshold of tolerance can utilize the advantage of both the
unconditional cooperator and the loner strategies. Namely, a
moderate tolerance threshold helps to utilize the synergy im-
pact of mutual cooperation but it can also keep defection at
a bearable level, which altogether can provide a reasonable
welfare for the whole community.
It is worth stressing that unconditional cooperator strategy
does not necessarily represent a “naive” approach from play-
ers. There can be those who are generally generous towards
others but do not want to invest extra effort to inspect others’
acts continuously. Being tolerant, however, involves not only
just a forgiving approach towards others but also assumes a
permanent monitoring of the neighborhood.
It has been studied intensively how players can avoid being
exploited in social dilemmas. One option could be to break
adverse ties or leaving an unsatisfactory neighborhood and
build new connections on social networks [39–46]. These
works focused on the evolving interaction graph and con-
cluded that emerging local homogeneities have a decisive im-
portance on the evolution of cooperation. Indeed, focusing
on the similarity of partners or tag-based support is a well-
known mechanism, which could provide a clear advantage for
cooperation [47–50]. But some tolerance, according to the
present study, might be beneficial, which has crucial impor-
tance especially when the average group size in a community
is considerably large.
Our paper underlines that the positive impact of tolerance
is robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in struc-
tured populations. The effect, however, is more pronounced
in a spatial system because network reciprocity augments the
basic mechanism. The supporting influence of spatiality could
explain the widespread emergence of tolerant behavior [51].
One may claim that strategy M is conceptually similar to
a tit-for-tat strategy [12, 52–54]. Indeed, there is some sim-
ilarity because M players can behave differently in different
situations, but the concept of tolerance offers a more sophis-
ticated reaction that is more beneficial to the whole commu-
nity. Our last figure illustrates that the best response to varying
conditions could be different and sometimes more, sometimes
less tolerance provides higher average income, hence a sim-
ple reactive strategy would be too rude to respond adequately,
especially in the case when multi-point or group interaction
is considered [55]. A logically similar approach could be the
possibility of conditional cooperation or conditional participa-
tion in joint efforts [56–59], but the present paper reveals the
significant role of additional cost, which was partly ignored in
previous works.
Being tolerant to a certain point can also be considered as
a threshold game where there is a nonlinear relation between
the benefit of the whole group and the proportion of coop-
erators [60–63]. Our model, however, is conceptually closer
to conditional strategies where the decision is made on a per-
sonal level which provides an optimal choice not only for an
individual but also for the whole community.
Lastly, we note that several pioneering works demonstrated
the utility of punishment but also highlighted its side effects
[64, 65]. Namely, it could be effective to control defection,
but simultaneously, the usage of punishment may lower the
9income of both punisher players and those who are punished.
On the other hand, reward has a cooperation supporting im-
pact but it also requires an additional source (of reward) to
apply it [66–71]. The presently discussed mechanism, how-
ever, offers a simple, but still effective, way on how we can
tame defection without losing well-being.
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